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Abstract
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long run investment choice and
a pricing decision facing the threat of entry. When the investment decision is not observed by the
potential entrant and the incumbent has private information on costs we show that an aggressive
pricing strategy restores the commitment value of investment in a separating equilibrium and
a¤ects the probability of entry.
1 Introduction
As it is well known, aggressive pricing strategies by an established rm has been conjectured for
a long time as a barrier to entry by potential entrants. Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) summarize
the idea of limit pricing by an incumbent as pricing below the monopoly price to make new entry
appear unattractive.1 They show that when the incumbent has private information, limit pricing
is an equilibrium strategy of a signalling game and the probability of entry may be a¤ected, but not
necessarily reduced. A necessary condition for a limit pricing strategy to deter entry is that it does
not perfectly disclose private information - as in an equilibrium where at least some pooling occurs.2
When - as in a separating equilibrium - the equilibrium strategy discloses precise information about
some characteristics of the protability of entry, the probability of entry is left una¤ected by the
First draft.
1Bolton et al. (2004) provide a similar denition for a predatory price, that is prot maximizing only because of
its exclusionary or other anticompetitive e¤ects.
2Similar results obtain when the signal is exogenously garbled by random shocks as in Saloner (????) and Matthews
and Mirman (1983) or endogenously jammed by the entrant, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (????).
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incumbents pricing choices. The inuence of this result on the subsequent analysis of managerial
strategies cannot be underscored and limit pricing has been considered as a self defeating strategy for
an incumbent subject to threat: by limit pricing, incumbent sacrices short-term prots without
a¤ecting long term competition (Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 2000) in the logic of burning
money result related to the interpretation of the separating equilibrium in signaling games.
In this paper we argue that pricing strategies can promptly convey information and a¤ect the
probability of entry when an unobservable long term investment decision is made by the incumbent
rm, along with a price decision, in a limit pricing framework. When information is disclosed,
as in a separating equilibrium, we show that limit pricing is useful to e¤ectively manipulate the
protability of entry and its equilibrium probability.
Under the two assumptions of no long term commitment to price and non observability of long
term investments it may seem-prima facie- that, relying on the standard models of entry deterrence
there is no way for the incumbent rm to a¤ect entry decisions. We show that this is not the case
and that limit pricing strategies, to the extent they convey information to the potential entrant,
restore the commitment value of long term investments and will a¤ect entry decisions.
The reason why limit pricing may restore the commitment value of unobservable long term
investments is quite intuitive and rests on a simple argument. The incentives to limit price in the
standard entry game with private information interact with the incentives to long term investments.
Consider a simple extension of the model analyzed in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), where the
incumbent has private information on its costs, extended to the case where an incumbents strategy
space is enlarged to include both an unobservable cost reducing investment decision and a pricing
decision taken under the threat of entry. A low cost incumbent limit prices in order not to be
confused with a high cost one, should entry occur. As a result larger quantities are produced and
the incentives to invest in cost reducing activities are increased, since they depend on the scale of
production. On the other hand, by observing price, the potential entrant has to make inferences on
the post entry market protability and will try to asses both his competitors cost and the amount of
investment that has been provided before entry. Since a low cost incumbent has larger incentives to
invest than a high cost one, limit pricing may be reinforced because lower prices credibly convey the
information that larger investment has been performed, reducing the probability of entry. When the
incumbents cost is common knowledge, on the other hand, both types of incumbent rms will price
at monopoly level and, due to non observability of the investment choice, will invest without taking
the entry deterrence impact of their choices into account. At equilibrium, therefore, one should
observe larger investment under limit pricing than under complete information. As a consequence
of greater incentives to invest in cost reducing activities the probability of entry is lower under limit
pricing.
We formalize the argument above in a setting similar to Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) where the
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incumbent has private information on its production costs and is uncertain about the production
costs of the potential entrant. We study a setting with a continuum of types and, for the sake of
simplicity, the same assumption of learning upon entry is made, so that the post entry competition is
expected to yield a Cournot-Nash duopoly outcome3. Under these assumptions we compare the level
of investment and pricing strategies by the incumbent in four regimes: a. blockaded entry, b. entry
threat under complete information when both the pricing strategy and the investment decision
are observable before entry, c. entry threat under complete information when pre-entry pricing,
investment and entry decisions are simultaneously taken, d. entry threat when the investment
decision is not observable whereas the pricing strategy is and satises conditions for the Pareto
e¢ cient separating equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a, Mailath, 1987).
The reason to concentrate on the separating equilibrium is two-fold. On the one hand- as it is
well known- it survives most commonly adopted equilibrium selection criteria among the pletora
of equilibria arising in signaling games. The second reason we concentrate on the separating equi-
librium relates to our specic interest, i.e., establishing whether, at an equilibrium where precise
information is disclosed, limit pricing with unobservable investment may a¤ect the probability of
entry by restoring the commitment value of non observable investment in entry deterrence strategies.
The results obtained show that our conjecture holds and limit pricing is part of an entry deter-
rence strategy and allows incumbent to restore the commitment value of non observable long term
investments. As for the resilience of our results, notice that in the analysis of strategic impact of
long term investment the commitment value relies on two fundamental features: the investment
cost has to be sunk and it has to be observable. Whereas sunkness of most investment strategies
is almost undisputed in the literature, observability of investment is less clear cut, specially as for
cost reducing activities. It may well be the case that many long term investment strategies are
not observable by potential entrants. Consider a few examples of extensively studied commitment
devices in oligopoly markets. Long term managerial contracts may a¤ect the competitive stance
of the rm but are not necessarily observed by potential entrants (Katz, 1991); credibly disclosing
information about the detailed impact of R&D investments protability may be prevented by the
incumbents willingness to keep his technology secret; the amount of e¤ort dedicated to learning
by doing at plant level can be di¢ cult to be observed by potential entrants just by denition.
Therefore, in the circumstances where long term investment is not observed by potential entrants,
limit pricing strategies can be seen as a device in the incumbents hand to rescue the commitment
value of unobservable investments. This has non negligible consequences both for the analysis of
managerial strategies and to frame public policy issues related to anti-trust.
The analysis of industries and rms subject to entry, both from the point of view of its anti-
3By disposing of the assumption of learning upon entry the expected outcome of post entry game is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of the Cournot game with two sided private information.
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trust implications and for the analysis of strategic management has relied on either the impact of
reputation concerns on pricing strategies (predatory pricing as in Milgrom and Roberts, 1982b) and
on long term strategic investment considerations and related commitment arguments (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984). In order to have an e¤ective entry deterrence strategy, according to this view the
external observer- a potential entrant (but also a policy concerned public agency involved in the
welfare assessment of such strategies)- has to base her judgement on a set of indicators and histories
that may be quite complicated. When reputational concerns are assumed to be relevant she has
to make inferences based on a su¢ ciently long span of observations and keep close scrutiny of the
relevant market in di¤erent periods or regions. When strategic barriers to entry may be relevant,
the entrants assessment of their commitment value, with special attention to their observability and
irreversibility has to be based on a full range of indicators of the incumbents long term investment
strategy, like advertising, R&D, distribution chains, product quality and so forth.
Under this respect the main point of this paper is that limit pricing may be involved in entry
deterrence strategies and that it actually signals their existence when long term investments are
not observable. Limit pricing in a model with unobservable investment allows the external observer
with a simple signal on which inferences about entry eterrence strategies may be based. We do
not address welfare analysis here, but it seems to us that this perspective may be relevant both for
the analysis of managerial strategy and for its implications on policy since, pricing below monopoly
price credibly signals the incumbents willingness and his actual ability to raise barriers to entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and derives equilib-
rium condition for pre-entry pricing and investment and for the probability of entry under complete
information and under private information of the incumbent about its costs, given a separating
equilibrium. Section 3 concludes.
2 Limit pricing and unobservable investment in a simple entry
game
We consider a simple two periods model. In each of the two periods i = A;B the market is
described by a linear inverse demand function P i =    Qi. There are two rms in this market,
rm 1 an incumbent and rm 2 a potential entrant. In period A the incumbent enjoys a monopoly
and chooses quantities qA1 and the level of cost reducing investment e1 a¤ecting current and future
costs. In period B, depending on the size of xed entry costs F a potential entrant may decide to
challenge the incumbent and enter the market. Should entry occur, the demand for each rm is
PB =    qB1   qB2 . Marginal costs are constant and, for rm 1, are given by 1 = c1   e1; where
c1 represents a cost component exogenously given and e1 represents the amount of cost reducing
activity that may be performed inside the rm at a cost  e21. The entrants marginal costs are given
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by 2.
The timing of the game is standard: in the rst period the incumbent operates as a monopolist
and has to decide a quantity qA1 and the size of a long term investment e
A
1 . After possibly observing
rst period strategies by the incumbent, the entrant may decide to challenge the incumbent and
entering the market.
The incumbents prots are given by
A1 = (P
A   1)qA1    (eA1 )2 (1)
in the rst period and by
B1 = (P
B   1)qB1 = (  qB1   qB2 )qB1 (2)
in the second period.
If the entrant decides to enter his prots will be
B2 = (P
B   c2)qA2   F = (  qB1   qB2 )qA2   F (3)
As for the information structure of the game, we follow Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and assume
that, unless di¤erently specied, the incumbent has private information on its production costs and
c1 is distributed with a atomless distribution function H(c1) on a closed interval [c1; c1], with density
h(c1) > 0 over the entire support, from the point of view of the entrant. As for the entrants cost,
c2 is distributed with a atomless distribution function G(c2) on a closed interval [c2; c2] with density
g(c2) > 0 over the entire support, from the point of view of the incumbent with  ,  and F
being common knowledge. In the analysis of the incumbent equilibrium behavior we will assume
no discounting of future prots. To simplify the algebra without altering our results we follow
Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) and assume learning upon entry so that, the expected outcome of
the game in the event of entry is the standard Cournot-Nash outcome. Before studying the entry
game we provide some simple characterization of the pricing and investment decision choices for an
incumbent rms not facing an entry threat.
2.1 Pricing and Investment under blockaded entry
When the incumbent does not face an entry threat (xed costs large enough) she will maximize the
ow of prots with respect to e¤ort and quantities. With blockaded entry, equilibrium quantity in
the second period will be given by
qB;m1 (e
A
1 ) = [  (c1   eA1 )]=2 (4)
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yielding monopoly prots given by
B;m1 = [  (c1   eA1 )]2=4 (5)
in the rst period, anticipating blockaded entry, the equilibrium strategies of the incumbent rm
will satisfy:
Max
(qA1 ;e
A
1 )
A1 + 
B;m
1    (eA1 )2 (6)
denoting equilibrium strategies in period A under blockaded entry as qA;m1 ; e
A;m
1 , they satisfy the
rst order conditions:
  2qA;m1   (c1   eA;m1 ) = 0 (7)
qA;1 + q
B;m
1 (e
A;m
1 )  2 eA;m1 = 0
solving (7) we get
qA;m1 =
 
2   1(  c1) (8)
eA;m1 =
1
2   1(  c1)
With global concavity of (6) warranted by  > 1=2 implied by the condition on positive marginal
costs, 1 > 0, warranted by  > =2c1 which we assume to hold.
Investment and pricing by an incumbent rm under blockaded entry will be one of our benchmark
to evaluate the e¤ects of limit pricing strategy under private information. Before moving to the study
of limit pricing under private information, however, lets study entry deterrence under complete
information. We will consider two alternative regimes for our comparison of the e¤ects of private
information and commitment observability in the presence of an entry threat. In the rst regime
we analyze the incentives for an established rm to use investment to deter entry, when pricing
strategies and investments by the incumbent are made simultaneously with the entry decision by
the entrant. In the second regime we analyze sequential entry game with observable investment and
pricing strategy.
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2.2 Threat of entry under complete information and observable investment
(commitment)
In this subsection we study the entry game under complete information on c1 and observable eA1 .
The entrant has private information on c2 before entry occurs, i.e., at the time the incumbent makes
its rst period choices. Due to the learning upon entry assumption, the second period outcome in
the event of entry will be the standard Cournot-Nash outcome
B;d1 (e
A
1 ) = [+ c2   2(c1   eA1 )]2=9 (9)
If the entrant decides to enter his prots will be
B;d2 (e
A
1 ) = [+ (c1   eA1 )  2c2]2=9  F (10)
As for the rst period the incumbent rationally expects the entrant to enter if and only if B2  0
that is, if and only if it holds
c2  ~c2(eA1 ) = [+ (c1   eA1 )  3
p
F ]=2 (11)
Therefore the equilibrium strategies of the incumbent can be obtained by solving
Max
(qA1 ;e
A
1 )
A1    (e1)2 +
~c2(:)Z
0
B;d1 (:)dG(c2) +
c2Z
~c2(:)
B;m1 (:)dG(c2) (12)
Denoting with qA;{1 , e
A;{
1 the equilibrium quantities and investment under the commitment
regime, equilibrium strategies satisfy the following rst order conditions:
  2qA;{1   (c1   eA;{1 ) = 0 (13)
qA;{1 + 
B;d
1 (~c2)g(~c2)
@~c2
@eA1
+
~c2(:)Z
0
@B;d1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2)
 B;m1 (~c2)g(~c2)
@~c2
@eA1
+
c2Z
~c2(:)
@B;m1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2)  2 eA;{1 = 0
The rst equation in (13) shows that monopoly pricing rule still obtains in the rst period
whereas, from inspecting the second equation in (13), incentives to investment are modied because
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of the commitment e¤ect. To provide some intuition and to analyze the second equation in (13) it
may be instructive to interpret its di¤erent terms driving the investment e¤ects. Given monopoly
pricing, the equilibrium level of investment due to the commitment e¤ect is balanced by di¤erent
forces, as in the analysis of strategies introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and commonly
adopted to classify business strategies.
qA;{1|{z}
Direct MB eA1
+ [B;d1 (~c2(:))  B;m1 (~c2(:))]g(~c2(:))
@~c2
@eA1| {z }
MB of eA1 from entry deterrence
+
~c2(:)Z
0
@B;d1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2)| {z }
MB of eA1 to accommodate entry
+
c2Z
~c2(:)
@B;m1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2)
| {z }
MB of eA1 if blockaded entry
  2 eA;{1| {z }
Marginal Cost of eA1
= 0
given our assumptions on the demand and cost functions these di¤erent bits may be computed given
(9), (5) and (11) and evaluated at em1 from equation (8) in order to verify whether overinvestment
due to entry deterrence is supported by commitment considerations for specic G(c2).
In general, dene ED = (1=2)[B;d1 (~c2(:))  B;m1 (~c2(:))]g(~c2(:)) evaluated at eA;m1 , the marginal
benet from increasing eA1 , due to the expected entry deterrence e¤ect; it measures the extra
incentives to aggressive investment generated by the threat of entry. Notice that ED > 0. Dene
EA =
~c2(:)Z
0

@B;d1 (:)
@eA1
  @
B;m
1 (:)
@eA1

dG(c2), evaluated at e
A;m
1 the extra-incentives to invest due to the
reduction in the market shares provided entry occurs, a scale e¤ect; it measures the possibly lower
incentives to investment by a monopolist when her market shares are threatened. This e¤ect
has been extensively studied in the Shumpeterian tradition on the relationship between market
structures and investment incentives. Notice that EA R 0, therefore the commitment value of long
term investment eA1 may or may not lead to over investment by an incumbent rm under entry
threat compared to blockaded entry; eA;{1 > e
A;m
1 if and only if ED + EA > 0.
In this subsection, reformulating the standard analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and
Tirole (1988) on investment choices, we have shown that e¤ective entry deterrence strategies may
indeed be supported by the commitment value. In order to study the e¤ect of commitment on
the probability of entry we move now to the analysis of long term investment strategy with non
observability of the incumbents strategies.
8
2.3 Threat of entry under complete information: investment for deterrence with
simultaneous entry decision
In this subsection we study the simple entry game when the pricing and investment strategies by
the incumbent are taken simultaneously with the entry decision. The interest of this case to our
aim is in that it drastically limits the possibility for the incumbent to convey credible information
to the entrant about post entry competition4. It will provide us with a benchmark to assess the
commitment value of long term investment in the case of observability of investment choices and
the scope for limit pricing to restore the commitment value under non observability of long term
investment.
In the occurrence of entry, second period prots are given by (9) and by (10) to the incumbent
and the entrant respectively. Given the post entry outcome rst period equilibrium strategies are
given by the equilibrium pricing and investment strategy by the incumbent and the entry choice
by the entrant. The cut o¤ level of c2 below which entry occurs is given by (11), whereas the rst
period strategies by the incumbent are the solution to
Max
(qA1 ;e1)
A1    (eA1 )2 +
~c2Z
0
B;d1 (:)dG(c2) +
c2Z
~c2
B;m1 (:)dG(c2) (14)
where, due to simultaneity, ~c2 is taken as given with respect to eA1 .
Denoting with qA;s1 , e
A;s
1 the equilibrium quantities and investment under no observability, they
satisfy the following rst order conditions:
  2qA;s1   (c1   eA;s1 ) = 0 (15)
qA;s1 +
~c2Z
0
@B;d1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2) +
c2Z
~c2
@B;m1 (:)
@eA1
dG(c2)  2 eA;s1 = 0
The rst equation in (15) shows that monopoly pricing rule still obtains in the rst period
whereas, from inspecting the second equation in (15) incentives to investment are modied in the
absence of the commitment e¤ect. Simple manipulation allow us to write the LHS of the second
4There are of course situtations in which this simple setting is also empirically relevant as in markets where secret
price discounting practices are adopted.
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equation in (15) as
qA;s1 + q
B;m
1 +
~c2Z
0
"
@B;d1 (:)
@e1
  @
B;m
1 (:)
@e1
#
dG(c2)  2 es1 (16)
by evaluating (15) at em1 dened in (7) we obtain the following
Lemma 1 In the absence of commitment value, the equilibrium level of long term investment under
entry threat eA;s1 may be above or below the level of investment under blockaded entry e
A;m
1 . A
su¢ cient condition for eA;s1 > e
A;m
1 is that entry is expected to occur at a su¢ ciently low scale.
Proof. by evaluating (15) at eA;m1 dened in (7) we obtain that q
A;s
1 = q
B;m
1 and therefore (16)
can be rewritten, after some simple algebra as
~c2Z
0
h
4=3qB;d1   qB;m1
i
dG(c2). Therefore, a su¢ cient
condition for eA;s1 > e
A;m
1 is (4=3)q
B;d
1   qB;m1 > 0.
That there may be overinvestment in the case of non observable strategies compared to blockaded
entry by the incumbent may seem surprising at a rst look. However, this is the point where the
hypothesis of "learning upon entry" bites: the incumbent knows that he can not directly manipulate
entrants expectations at the entry stage. Remember, though, that it is common knowledge that
once entry has occurred costs become revealed, therefore the incumbent may still be willing to
accommodate entry on his preferred terms, manipulating the reaction functions in the post entry
game.5
More interestingly for our aim is the following
Lemma 2 Equilibrium investment with commitment is larger than in the case of non observability
of the entrants strategy. It holds: i. eA;{1 > e
A;s
1 and ii. ~c2(e
A;{
1 ) < ~c2(e
A;s
1 )
Proof. Evaluate (13) at eA1 = e
A;s
1 and get result i.; to get ii. evaluate ~c2(:) at the two investment
levels.
Therefore we have seen that observability of commitment improves the incentives to invest in
long term cost reducing activities and negatively a¤ects the probability of entry compared to non
observability of the incumbents strategies. We are ready now for studying the case of private
information of the incumbent on its costs.
5 In this case rather than raising entry barriers the incumbent is escavating entry traps, invisible from outside the
market, indeed not unexpected in a Nash equilibrium, and denitely observed after entry because of our simplifying
hypothesis of learning upon entry.
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2.4 Observable pricing strategies restore the commitment value of long term
investments: a limit pricing mechanism
In this section we show that the observability of pricing strategy restores the commitment value of
non observable investments when the incumbent faces an entry threat. Dene 1 = c1   eA1 and its
expectation conditional on the observed rst period quantity strategy as E

1 j qA1

= ^1. Given
the assumption of learning upon entry, at the time the entry decision has to be made, the entrant
has an expected prot from entry dened by
E
h
B;d2 (e1) j qA1
i
= E

(+ 1   2c2)2=9  F j qA1

(17)
In a separating equilibrium qA1 = (1) with  continuous and strictly monotone (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1982 and Mailath, 1987). Therefore equilibrium beliefs satisfy
^1 = 1 = 
 1(qA1 ): (18)
The equilibrium cut o¤ level of c2 below which the entrant will enter is
~c2 = [+ 
 1(qA1 )  3
p
F ]=2 (19)
the equilibrium strategies by the incumbent can therefore be obtained by studying
Max
(qA1 ;e1)
A1    (eA1 )2 +
~c2(qA1 )Z
0
B;d1 (:)dG(c2) +
c2Z
~c2(qA1 )
B;m1 (:)dG(c2)
Dene qA;lp1 and e
lp
1 the equilibrium quantity level and cost reducing investment respectively.
First order conditions satisfy:
  2qA;lp1   1 +
n
B;d1 [~c2(q
A;lp
1 )]  B;m1 (:)
o
g(~c2)
d~c2
dqA1
= 0 (20)
qA;lp1   2 elp1
~c2(qA1 )Z
0
@B;D1 (:)
@e1
+
c2Z
~c2(qA1 )
@B;m1 (:)
@e1
dG(c2) = 0 (21)
Using (19), (18), (9) and (17), simple algebraic manipulations allow us to write (20)
as
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dqA;lp1
d1
=   [2(  1)
p
F   F ]g(~c2)
16[qA;lp1    12 ]
(22)
Which denes the di¤erential equation to be satised at ^1 = 1 with the initial value condition
for the Pareto e¢ cient separating equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts,1982, Mailath, 1987) given by
qA;lp1 [c1   elp1 (c1)] = qA;m1 =
  [c1   elp1 (c1)]
2
(23)
where elp1 (c1) satises (21).
Simple algebra also allow us to write (21) as
qA;lp1 + q
B;m
1   2 elp1 +
~c2(qA1 )Z
0
"
@B;D1 (:)
@eA1
  @
B;m
1 (:)
@eA1
#
dG(c2) = 0 (24)
and as
qA;lp1 + q
B;m
1   2 elp1 +
~c2(qA1 )Z
0
h
4=3qB;D1   qB;m1
i
dG(c2) = 0 (25)
The equilibrium strategies for the entry game under private information of the incumbent on c1
is therefore described by (25), (20), (23) as for the incumbent strategies and (19) as for the entrant.
For a given distribution function of the entrants costs satisfying the assumptions of atomless G(c2)
and g(c2) > 0 we would be able to solve (25) for e
lp
1 (c1) to substitute it into (20) and to solve the
resulting di¤erential equation for qA;lp1 (c1) since
dqA;lp1
d1
=
dqA;lp1
dc1
:6 We do not pursue the study of
the di¤erential equation here and we limit our selves to notice that, as in the case of Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), it holds
Proposition 3 In a separating equilibrium of the entry game with unobservable investment it holds
dqA;lp1
dc1
< 0 and qA;lp1 (c1)   [c1 e
lp
1 (c1)]
2 , with equality at c1 = c1:
Proof. dq
A;lp
1
dc1
< 0 is implied by type monotonicity (Mailath, 1987), that is @21=@qA1 @c1 < 0 holding
in this model. Consider next that the numerator of (22) is given by
n
2[  (c1   elp1 (c1))]
p
F   F
o
g(~c2).
g(~c2) > 0 by assumption for c2 2 [c¯ 2; c2], therefore it is positive i¤ [2(   1)
p
F   F ] > 0,
which is satised under the necessary condition for entry to be viable, i.e. that xed entry costs
6As an example we computed, but not reported here, the solution for the case of a uniform distribution with
g(c2) = 1=[ c2 c¯2]. The structure of (22) allows the separation of variables method to be solved yielding an implicitfunction describing the equiibrium relationship between qA;LP1 and c1.
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are low enough to be covered by monopoly prots, i.e. F < (   1)2=4. Therefore it must be
 [qA;lp1    [c1 e
lp
1 (c1)]
2 ] < 0 that is q
A;lp
1 >
 [c1 elp1 (c1)]
2 . Finally the initial value condition requires
qA;lp1 =
 [c1 elp1 (c1)]
2
In other words upward distortion of rst period quantity levels by the incumbent rm obtains,
i.e. limit pricing must part of the equilibrium entry deterrence strategy in a separating equilibrium.
Limit pricing requires a larger scale of production in the rst period by the incumbent rm than
under complete information. To evaluate whether the scale e¤ect associated to limit pricing in
the rst period enhances incentives to investment and the probability of entry evaluate the set
of rst order conditions under private information with the set of rst order condition under non
observability, i.e. (25) at (16) and get the following
Corollary 4 Investment (probability of entry) under limit pricing is larger (lower) than under rst
period simultaneous choice of price investment entry decision equilibrium; i.e., it holds i: elp1  es1
and ii: ~c2(e
A;lp
1 ) > ~c2(e
s
1).
Proof. notice that (25) is positive at es1 as long as q
A;lp
1 > q
A;s
1 which is true since q
A;s
1 = q
B;m
1 =
 [c1 es1(c1)]
2 . By using the denition of ~c2(:),notice that i: immediately implies ii:
Therefore, we have shown that in a separating equilibrium the scale e¤ect associated with the
limit pricing strategy involves a scale e¤ect that drives overinvestment compared to the case of
simultaneous choice of entry deterrence strategies and entry decision by the entrant. This e¤ect
drives the probability of entry down restoring some commitment value of non observable investment
with long term e¤ect on the incumbents costs.7
3 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that limit pricing strategy are part of an e¤ective entry deterrence
strategy when the incumbent cost reducing investments are not observable by the entrant. In this
case the neutrality of limit pricing separating strategies on the probability of entry does not hold
anymore. In many industries the assumption of observability of long term investments by agents
external to the rm does not necessarily hold, as in the case where detailed information on R&D
7The relationship between eA;LP1 , e
A;M
1 and e
A;{
1 can be studied under specic assumptions on G(c2) but we do
not pursue this here. It may be worth noticed that the comparison between eA;LP1 and e
A;M
1 depend on the expected
impact of entry on the market shares. Limit pricing involve an increase in the scale of production in period A but
anticipate the possibility of scale reduction due to entry whereas, under blockaded entry, the monopolist discount
a larger market share in period two. A similar mechanism is at work in the comparison between eA;LP1 and e
A;{
1 .
Also notice that, since the scale e¤ect under limit pricing depends on c1 it may well be the case that, under private
information and obsevable prices low cost incumbent over-invest compared to the case of observable commitment,
whereas high cost types will under invest.
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expenditure cannot be released because of secrecy concerns by the incumbent, in the case where
learning by doing occurs at the plant level or rms costs depend on managerial e¤ort which is
not observed by the entrant. Our results suggest that, specially in these industries, limit pricing
is still a valuable framework both for the analysis of managerial strategies and for the assessment
of the incumbents behavior from the point of view of public agencies in charge of controlling
anti competitive behavior by established rms. It goes almost without saying that, by increasing
incentives to investment for incumbent rms limit pricing may be welfare improving. The precise
assessment of the impact of limit pricing strategies on social welfare is, however, outside the scope
of the paper and left for future work.
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